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Torts. Torts are governed by the law of the place where they have
occurred. The security of individuals and property within the limits
of each territory demand this. On the other hand, when a person
within a certain territory performs an act, which the local law does
not forbid, his immunity ought to be recognized also abroad. Such
freedom from liability was recognized by the court of Amsterdam
with respect to a seizure made abroad, the seizure being legal accord-
ing to foreign law, but illegal according to Dutch law.75  But the act
of a bookkeeper, who had collected money without authority by means
of a forged receipt, was regarded as a tort, in accordance with the
law of the place where the act had been done. 78 The same rule pre-
vails on the subject of collision of ships,77 so far as the provisions of
the International Treaty of September 23 d, i9io, are not applicable.7 8
When a collision occurs on the high seas between ships of different
nationality, many systems are possible. A Dutch decision applies the
lez fori7 " and with this Kosters8 ° agrees.
LAW CONCERNING RELATIONSHIP
Marriage. In general there is a clear distinction in the law of
marriage between form and capacity. Many theories are possible in
respect to the selection of the law governing marriage and the power
to marry; the personal law of the husband governs matrimonial
matters in general, and the personal law of each of the parties, their
power to marry. Let us first examine the condition of persons com-
ing from countries like the United States, which have not joined the
Treaty of the Hague. 81 We shall thereafter briefly touch upon the
" Ct. Amsterdam (Jan. 31, i916) W. 9925; Trib. 's Hertogenborch (June 27,
1917), (1917) N. J. 12D5.
" Ct. Amsterdam (June 5, 1914), (1914) N. J. 1115; cf. also Trib. Amsterdam
(May io, 1918) W. io327, (1i8) N. J. 821.
" Trib. Dordrecht (Oct. 25, I96), (9,7) N. J. 390; Trib. Rotterdam (Nov.
I, .917), (igi8) N. J. 952.
"Being in force in Holland according to the law of Jan. 11, 1913, Staatsblad,
26-27.
79Trib. Rotterdam (Nov. 6, I895), (1895) Magasiin Van Handelsrecht, 264.
" Kosters, 799.
'Treaty of June I2, igoz, in force by law of July 24, 19o3, Staatsblad, 231.
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Treaty, which does not differ very much from the law operating out-
side of the Treaty territory.
Dutchmen abroad and foreigners in Holland are governed by their
national law, in respect of their power to marry. As regards Dutch-
men this can be deduced from article 138 of the Civil Code, which
states that marriages contracted by Dutchmen or by a Dutchman and
a foreigner, have no validity if the parties, as far as they have the
Dutch nationality, have violated the Dutch provisions concerning the
essential operative facts required to constitute a valid marriage. This
article prohibits, therefore, the marriage of a Dutchman with a Moham-
medan already married, because Dutch law does not permit polygamy.
As regards foreigners also, the power to marry is, generally speak-
ing, governed by their personal law. The recognition of the personal
law may clash, however, with the Dutch public policy or good morals,
so that capacity for marriage that exists according to the personal law
of a foreigner, may not be admitted in the Netherlands. Dutch courts
would consider that the prohibition of bigamy, the prohibition of
marriage between near relatives, or the want of the free consent of
the parties so concerns public policy as to avoid the marriage, even
though it is perfectly valid according to the personal law of the
parties.
The prohibition of marriage between near relatives would probably
be applied in the following manner. When there is an absolute pro-
hibition in the Dutch law, nor avoidable by dispensation, such a
prohibition should be applied to foreigners; but when dispensation is
allowed, this possibility should be extended to foreigners as well as to
Dutchmen.
It is an interesting problem whether the Dutch provision, forbidding
the marriage of a person convicted of adultery with his accomplice,
is applicable to foreigners. 82 The Dutch legislation on this point seeks
to prevent adultery as much as possible. In consequence of this sys-
tem our courts have decided that this prohibition applies also to f or-
eigners who desire to marry their accomplice in Holland, although their
national law does not forbid the marriage.83 Jitta doubts whether
these decisions- are correct.8 4
There is still another curious point of dispute. The Tribunal at
Amsterdam is of opinion that the prohibition of article 89 of the
Civil Code, just referred to, is only applicable to Dutch husbands or
wives, who have been guilty of adultery and now want to marry in
Holland. The consequence of this limited application of the Dutch
law is that a marriage concluded by a Dutch husband with his accom-
"Art. 89, Dutch Civil Code.




plice cannot be recognized in Holland, but that the Dutch law has no
objection to the recognition of a marriage concluded abroad by a
married man who has a foreign nationality, with his Dutch accom-
plice.85 The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, however, hold-
ing that the Dutch law revolts against any disturbance of family life
by an accomplice of Dutch nationality. Marriages concluded abroad
by such accomplices and foreigners cannot be recognized, therefore,
as valid in the Netherlands. 8
Our courts have not passed upon the other prohibitions existing
under Dutch law. They would probably refuse to recognize even
the validity of a subsequent marriage by a divorced person, because
Dutch law forbids such marriages of Dutchmen.
On the contrary, the Dutch authorities and courts sometimes allow
marriages to be concluded in the Netherlands, when only their personal
law and not the lex fori forbids the marriage.- For example, an Italian
citizen whose national law forbids his marriage on account of natural
impotence8" will be allowed to marry in Holland because an equivalent
provision is unknown in this country. For the same reason prohibi-
tion to marry based upon religious or economical reasons or upon
differences of race cannot be recognized in Holland.
As regards the form of celebrating marriages, Dutch law only knows
civil marriage, 8 which, according to the general rules, are governed
as to the mode of celebration by the law of the place where they are
concluded. In other countries marriage may have a religious char-
acter, so that the mode of marrying may be subject also to the pro-
visions of the national law, which are applicable to the citizen even
abroad. In the Netherlands foreigners as well as natives can get
married only in one way, namely, by appearing before a registrar.
This rule is so strict that a clergyman performing any religious cere-
mony prior to the secular marriage, is liable to penalty.8 9 Our pro-
visions concerning the form of marriages are very strict. Marriages
concluded by foreigners in Holland can be annulled on account of
non-compliance with the provisions concerning the form of celebra-
tion, even when the provisions of both systems of law with regard
to the intrinsic validity of the marriage have been observed.
On the other hand, a marriage concluded abroad by a Dutchman
in accordance with the law of the place of celebration, is considered
to be valid, although the celebration is purely a religious one, or
consists solely of mutual consent.90 Dutchmen living abroad are sub-
mitted, however, by Dutch law to more stringent rules if the Dutch
' Trib. Amsterdam (June 26, 1914) W. 9767.
Ct. Amsterdam (May 25, 1915) W. 9894.
" Art. lo7, Italian Civil Code. 'Art. 83, Dutch Civil Code.
'Art. 449, Dutch Penal Code.
°Trib. Arnhem (Sept. 15, 1881) W. 4748; Trib. The Hague (Dec. 5, 1911)
W. 9614; Ct The Hague (June 29, 1914) W. 9668.
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spouse has his domicil in Holland up to the moment of the marriage
or has had such domicil there within the last six months; due publica-
tion of the marriage must be made at such domicil according to the
provisions of the Dutch law.91 Formerly the courts were in doubt
whether a marriage might be annulled because of a failure to make
such a publication, but an amendment to the article above mentioned,
adopted in 19o6, makes it clear that the marriage cannot be annulled
on that ground.
When a Dutchman, married abroad, returns to his native country,
it is his duty to have his marriage license registered within a year at
his new domicil. The failure to do so does not constitute, however,
a ground for annulment.9 2 If the registration has not been effected
within a year after his return an order of a court authorizing the
same is necessary.93
These instances show that the annulment of a marriage, once con-
cluded, will rarely be pronounced. This appears also from the fact
that if a Dutchman marrying abroad does not satisfy the conditions
required by his personal law for the intrinsic validity of marriage,
the marriage is not absolutely void, but can be annulled only through
a judicial proceeding. Indeed, the general rule is that a marriage
is never ipso facto void, a judicial declaration being always required.94
Sometimes there is an infraction of the law, but the court cannot annul
the marriage. Such is the case when a person, being of age but.not
having reached his thirtieth year, has not attained the required con-
sent of his kinfolks nor a judical decree dispensing with such
requirement.
95
The Treaty of the Hague applies only to subjects of the participat-
ing Governments which have ratified it.98 Dutch courts are not
obliged to apply the treaty to Austrian subjects, because Austria did
not ratify the treaty, although it took part in the conference.
The principal rule laid down by the treaty is that the capacity to
marry is to be judged according to the personal law.9 7  The Supreme
Court applied this provision once when it held that the Registrar was
justified in his refusal to celebrate a marriage because the woman,
who was a German, could not produce a certificate that she possessed
the capacity to marry. She had been unable to obtain such a certificate,
because her divorce from her first husband in Holland could not be
'
1Art. 138, Dutch Civil Code.
'Art. 139, Dutch Civil Code; Ct. Amsterdam (Nov. 4, i886) W. 5165; Trib.
Rotterdam (March 23, 19o3) W. 80o2.
" Trib. Almelo (Aug. 27, I8gi) W. 6137.
"Art. 140, Civil Code. See also Sup. Ct (Dec. 7, 1877) W. 4191; Ct. The
Hague (June 29, '914) W. 9668; Ct. Amsterdam (May 25, 1915) W. 9894.
" Ct. Amsterdam (Oct. 21, 1918) W. IO342.
" Sup. Ct. (Feb. 14, i919) W. io396, (igg) N. J. 324.
"Art. i.
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recognized in Germany. The woman was considered, therefore, as
still married in Germany, and was thus unable to prove her own
capacity to marry again s
Does the term "national law"9 9 comprise all kinds of impediments
to marriages, including tiose of public law, such as the German and
Belgian ,provisions requiring the fulfilment of military duties before a
marriage can be concluded? Some Dutch registrars have celebrated
the marriage of Belgian or German deserters, who could not show
any proof of their compliance with military laws, because the "national
law" was regarded as referring merely to private law, and this view
has been sanctioned by some courts.1 The Supreme Court has held,
however, that the provision embraces all impediments, even those
derived from public law. Foreign deserters are not allowed to marry
in Holland, therefore, when their personal law forbids the marriage.
2
According to the Treaty, the law of the place of celebration may
prohibit marriages, valid according to the personal law of the parties,
because they are contrary to certain specified provisions of the lex loci2
A marriage which is void according to the national law of the parties,
may be authorized, on the other hand, if the prohibition of the personal
law is based exclusively upon considerations of a religious nature, and
would conflict, therefore, with the public policy of the state.,
Article 5 of the Treaty regulates the form in which marriages may
be celebrated and provides that if the marriage has been entered into
in the forms prescribed by the leax loci actus, it shall be recognized
as lawful everywhere. The national law of the parties must be fol-
lowed, however, as regards publication. Failure to "do so may render
the marriage void in the country whose laws have not been observed,
but it is valid elsewhere. As the omission of such publication does
not.render the marriage void according to Dutch law, this article has
no great importance with respect to Dutchmen marrying abroad.
Effect of Marriage on Property of Husband and Wife. The law
governing the property rights of husband and wife has been the sub-
ject of long and famous disputes. This question is a difficult one,
especially in connection with immovables. It is a famosissima quaestio
whether the property of husband and wife is to be governed by one
law-that is, the domiciliary or the personal law-or whether the im-
" Sup. Ct. (Sept. 26, I98), (1918) N. J. ioi6.
' Art. i of the Treaty.
'Trib. 's Hertogenborch (Jan. 4, 1917) W. IoIoo, (1917) N. J. 130; Trib.
Dordrecht (Oct 4, 1917) W. I0175, (i918) N. J. Io7; Trib. Haarlem (Sept. x,
i918) W. 10329.
2 Sup. Ct. (Sept. 26, 1918) W. io315, (i918) N. J. ioi5; also Kosters, 394-395.
3 Art. 2. See Trib. Amsterdam (May 4, i9o6) W. 8588; Sup. Ct. (April i6,
i9o8) W. 8718.
!Art. 3.
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movables should be subject to the law of the country where they are
located. In Holland there is a general opposition to the theory that
the lex rei sitae should determine the condition of property brought
into marriage. It is felt that a universal assignment should be
governed by a single law.5
In the absence of a marriage contract, the Dutch courts are very
liberal in applying foreign law. The earlier Dutch decisions usually
hold that the explicit or the supposed will of the parties controls.
6
This will may be deduced from statements the married couple made
to third persons, from their conduct before or after the marriage, or-
if this does not explain anything-from an impartial examination of
the circumstances, such as the nationality or domicil of the husband
or the place where the marriage has been celebrated. When the law
of the nationality and that of the domicil of the husband coincide,
many judges used to apply formerly that law to matrimonial property.
Where the husband's personal law differs from that of the parties'
domicil, the lex domicili was considered decisive.7 Notwithstanding
this fact, the Tribunal of Amsterdam has held that the husband's
personal law was applicable.8  This decision supports the new doe-
trine, which prefers the personal statute to the system of the parties'
autonomy. The new system is a consequence of the idea that rights
and duties resulting from the existence of matrimonial property are
closely connected with the interests of the whole family and with mar-
ital power. The parties have the power to make a marriage contract,
but if they do not make use of this power, no conclusion can be drawn
with respect to their will. Their will not being expressed, the law
governing should be the personal law. When the husband has no
nationality at all, the law of the common council of the spouses takes
the place of the husband's national law.9 This system has gradually
been accepted by the Dutch courts10 and is also inserted in the Treaty
of the Hague.
When there is a marriage contract, the personal law of each of the
spouses governs their capacity to enter into it; the form is determined
by the lex loci actus. Such contracts when made by Dutchmen abroad
'Ct. Leeuwarden (June 29, 1887) W. 5515; Trib. Winschoten (Jan. ig, i9io)
W. 9o3; Sup. Ct. (Jan. 6, 1911) W. 9x25.
'Ct. 's Hertogenborch (Feb. ig, 1878) W. 4221; Ct. Leeuwarden, preceding
note; Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. i, i9o7) W. 88og.
'Trib. Winschoten (Jan. 27, x886, and June 16, 1886) W. 5447; Ct. Amsterdam
(Dec. x5, 1892) W. 63o3, and the decisions of courts of 's Hertogenborch and
Leeuwarden, preceding note.
'Trib. Amsterdam .(Nov. i, i9o7) W. 88og.
'E. M. Meyers, in W. P. N. R., 2361.
" Ct. 's Hertogenborch (June 27, i9o5) W. 8272, and (April 7, i9o8) W. 8802;
Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. i3, i9o8) W. 8916; Trib. Rotterdam (March 8, igog)
W. 8953; Ct. Amsterdam (June 6, i919) W. io444.
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may a a rule be recognized in the Netherlands, but their contents
must always be compared with the provisions of the husband's national
law, so far as these provisions have an imperative character. For
example, the provisions guaranteeing to the wife her earnings, are
always determined by the husband's national law.
The courts will not readily admit that marriage contracts made by
Dutchmen abroad and referring in general terms to a law other than
the personal law of the husband, are to be considered valid. The
Tribunal at Rotterdam denied the validity of a "deed of gift" made
in England, according to British law,'by a Dutch husband to his
wife. It was held that inasmuch as no marriage contract had been
made, no foreign law could govern matrimonial property, but only
the personal law of the husband, which did not recognize deeds of
such a nature." In the same way ambiguous terms and omissions in
marriage contracts are to be interpreted according to the husband's
personal law.
12
When a foreigner marries in Holland, even with a Dutch woman,
their marriage contract, if made in accordance with the national
law, is valid unless it conflicts with Dutch opinion about good
morals-a fact which the courts do not readily admit. It is advis-
able, however, for foreigners to execute their marriage contracts
in Holland according to the formalities prescribed by Dutch law, for
it is not certain that the judge would approve an instrument under
private signature, even though it is sufficient according to the national
law.
Article 198 of the Civil Cpde, forbidding a reference to foreign law
in general terms, is applicable only to persons whose matrimonial
property is governed by Dutch law, and is intended to prevent an
evasion of Dutch law. It is not applicable to foreigners.
Article 207 of the Civil Code provides that marriage contracts
adopting another system than that of a legal community of goods,
operate against third persons only from the moment that they are
entered upon a public register, which is kept at the office of the tri-
bunal within whose jurisdiction the marriage has been celebrated, or
in case the marriage took place abroad, where the marriage license
-was filed. This article does not apply to foreigners married abroad
who have established their domicil in Holland.' 4 Third persons have,
therefore, no right to assume, from the mere fact that no marriage
contract can be found upon the Dutch registers, that none was entered
into.
"Trib. Rotterdam (March 8, 1go9) W. 8953.
1" Trib: Maastricht (Nov. 9, 1871) W. 3513.
" Sup. Ct. (June 24, 1898) W. 7141; Kosters, 448.
" Ct. 's Hertogenborch (April 21, 1914) W. 9595, W. P. N. R. 232o; Sup. Ct.
(Jan. 8, 191) W. 9762.
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A change in the nationality of husband and wife does not cause
the new national law to govern their matrimonial property. Such a
change would ordinarily result from a change of nationality, but the
law governing matrimonial property operates unchanged, during the
existence of the marriage. Some legal systems, including the Dutch,
forbid any change in the marriage contract during the marriage.
In other countries-so far as the law permits a voluntary change of
nationality during marriage-a change in the law governing their
matrimonial property is possible only by virtue of a special declaration
of the will. It would be wrong to deduce from the simple change of
nationality the intention of the parties to submit their property to the
new personal law. Although there are no decisions on the point, it
seems advisable when the first personal law forbids an alteration of
the contract and the later personal law allows it, to apply the new
personal law to this extent, that the prohibition should have effect no
longer, and husband and wife should be, in accordance with the new
law, entitled to change their marriage articles 1 5
The provisions of the Treaty of the Hague relating to matrimonial
property agree substantially with the Dutch law. They lay down the
general rule that when no marriage contract has been made, movables
as well as immovables are governed by the personal law of the hus-
band at the moment of the celebration of the marriage.16 The capacity
of the parties to make a marriage contract is determined by their
personal law, while the intrinsic validity and the legal consequences
of the contract depend on the husband's national law.1 7 The national
law of the parties determines also whether they can enter into a mar-
riage contract during their marriage or change an existing contract 18
A change in the nationality of either husband or wife or of both has
no influence upon their property,1 9 whether a marriage contract exists
or not. The power to enter into a marriage contract or to alter an
existing contract is determined by the personal law of the spouses at
the time such contract or such alteration is made.
With regard to the form of marriage contracts; the Treaty adopts
the rule that the form is to be determined according to the laws of
the place where the contract was made. This rule has an optional
character, and the contract is valid also if it conforms to the national
law of each of the parties at the time of the marriage or of the making
of the deed, if this should occur during marriage." When the national
law of the spouses is not the same, the form of the lex loci must be
satisfied. If the personal law of one of the parties positively requires
its provisions regarding form to be followed, even though this contract
"Kosters, 454, following French jurisprudence.
"'Art. 2. 'Arts. 3, 5.
"Art 4. ' Art. 2.
"Art. 6.
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is made abroad, such provisions must be followed.2' This constitutes
an explicit infraction of the general rule, "locus regit actum."
Divorce and separation from bed and board. It is advisable to dis-
tinguish the conditions submitted to the Hague Convention"2 from those
standing apart from that Convention.
Beginning with the latter, to which belong the relations between the
United States and the Netherlands, we notice that the law governing
Dutchmen abroad and that which governs foreigners in Holland are
different. A divorce of Dutchmen and a separation from bed and
board (which we will include under the term "divorce") can be pro-
nounced by a foreign court. Such a decree may be recognized in
Holland, provided, however, the foreign court had jurisdiction and
that Dutch laws concerning the conditions of divorce have been ob-
served. This is a strict application of the statutum personale, which
in regard to Dutchmen is to be found in article 6, Wet A. B.
The same principle is not applied, however, to foreigners seeking a
divorce in Holland. On grounds of public policy all persons residing
within Dutch territory, either foreigners or Dutchmen, are treated
alike. The courts accordingly apply the lex fori, not, only with respect
to the question whether a divorce-is permissible at all, but also with
respect to the causes for divorce."8 If Dutch law prohibits a divorce,
it cannot be pronounced, although it is permitted by the personal law;
on the contrary, if it is permitted by Dutch law, the divorce may be
pronounced, notwithstanding a prohibition by the national law. In our
opinion the Dutch courts have gone too far in the direction of applying
the lex fori, and it would have been better if the personal law had been
recognized either exclusively or in conjunction with the lex fori. At-
tention should be called, however, to a decision of a Court of Appeal,
holding that -no divorce is possible for a cause which the national law
does not admit, because the lex fori cannot call into existence a situation
prohibited by the national law.7 7
While there are few cases of interest involving the substantive law
of divorce, many questions have arisen in respect to jurisdiction. It is
a general rule that Dutch authorities have jurisdiction in regard to
foreigners, when there is a court which is competent, ratione loci.
Dutch courts may likewise recognize foreign decrees granting a
divorce to Dutchmen, provided that the foreign court was competent
according to its own law and applied Dutch law in accordance with the
Dutch views concerning public policy and good morals.
According to Dutch law the district court of the husband's domicil78
is competent to grant a divorce, both as regards Dutchmen and for-
'Art. 6, par. 2.
"Treaty of June i2th, i9o2, approved by Dutch law of July 24th, 19o3, and
ratified by the Crown.
Sup. Ct. (Dec. 13, 1907) W. 8636.
Ct. Arnhem (Dec. 23, 19o3) W. 8o43.
7'Art 262, Dutch Civil Code.
LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS
eigners. 79 The courts are incompetent when the husband has his
domicil abroad."0 In this case the court should dismiss the petition
of its own accord, without a request from one of the parties."' Simple
residence on the defendant's part or doinicil on the plaintiff's part do
not confer jurisdiction upon the Dutch courts. This condition of our
law is very unfortunate for the woman whose husband has moved to
another country after the cause for divorce has arisen. The wife may,
of course, always sue before the jurisdiction of the husband's new
domicil abroad. But there are some difficulties to be overcome. In
the first place, the foreign court must be competent according to its
own law, and secondly, the decree rendered must be proper for recog-
nition in the Netherlands, as outlined above.82 Article 7 of the Hague
Convention requires the recognition of such a decree as regards Con-
vention territory.
When the cause for divorce is malicious desertion, Dutch law con-
fers jurisdiction upon the court of the last common domicil of husband
and wife.8 3  No competent judge is available when the last common
domicil lies abroad. If the deserting husband returns to Holland and
re-establishes his domicil in this country-provided it be apart from
his wife-the court of his actual domicil has jurisdiction.8"
It might be suggested that when a husband leaves Holland with the
intention of escaping a justifiable suit for divorce, Dutch courts should
be competent on account of the husband's acting in fraud of the law,
but the courts hold otherwise. Dutch courts have rarely admitted the
principle that the prevention of fraus legis is a positive rule of private
international law.
All decrees for the dissolution of a marriage by divorce, or by a
separation from bed and board for five years, must be entered upon
a public register, and until such registration the marriage is not dis-
solved. "" Formerly our law required this inscription to be made upon
the register at the domicil of the spouses, that is, the husband's domicil.
Whenever the husband had removed to another country, great diffi-
culty arose because of the failure of the law to specify a particular
register for this case. Marriages which could not be entered in any
register remained, therefore, unaffected. Only when the cause of the
divorce was malicious desertion was the register of the last common
domicil considered the right one. 8
Trib. Zutphen (Nov. 27, 1902) W. 7871.
Ct. Amsterdam (May 25, 19oo) W. 7498; Ct. The Hague (Nov. 6, 1907)
W. 8620; Sup. Ct. (Jan. 23, 19o8) W. 8656.
STrib. Amsterdam (Oct. 13, 1905) W. 8415; Ct. The Hague (May i, 19o6)
W. 10017; Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. I, 1918), (1919) N. J. 4o3.
' Ct. The Hague (Feb. 7, 1916) W. 9938.
'Art 266, Dutch Civil Code.
" Sup. Ct. (May 28, 1897) XV. 698o; Ct. The Hague (June 26, 19o2) W. 9393.
"Art. 276, Dutch Civil Code.
" Ct. Leeuwarden (Oct. 2, 1913) W. 9532.
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This defect in our law was corrected by the Act of March 25, 1915,
altering the text of article 276 of the Civil Code. Since that date the
registration has to be made in the place where the marriage was cele-
brated, or, when concluded abroad, at The Hague. In this way regis-
tration is always possible and the decree of dissolution has the desired
result. The new provision is applicable, however, only to marriages
dissolved by Dutch courts, not to divorces pronounced abroad, even
though between Dutch parties. Those dii orces are governed by the
law of the place where the dissolution was pronounced. This conse-
quence is reasonable, because article 276 of the Civil Code is merely a
provision about form, so that the lex loci actus is decisive as to the
question whether the divorce ought to be registered and how this ought
to be done.
The law applicable to divorce, so far as Holland is concerned in its
relation to most of the other European states, is to be found in the pro-
visions of the Hague Convention. In the first place, the treaty states
that the question whether a divorce can be pronounced, as well as the
grounds for which such a decree can be rendered, is to be determined
both by the personal law of the spouses at the moment the suit is
brought, and by the lex fori. The conditions of both laws must be
satisfied. The courts of the country where the suit is brought are
allowed, however, to dispense with the application of the leax fori and
to be content with the observance of the personal law. 7 This pro-
vision is of no consequence in the Netherlands, because in this country
the observance of both the lex fori and the personal law is required. ss
This system of the necessary observance of two laws has been miti-
gated in Article 2 of the Convention to this extent, that although a
cause of divorce is required according to both laws, it is not necessary
that this cause should be the same. It is sufficient that a cause for
divorce exists under each law.8 9
The treaty also gives rules about jurisdiction. The suit for divorce
may be brought before the court which is competent according to the
personal law of husband and wife, as well as before that of the parties'
domicil90 Our courts hold that this provision contains entirely new
rules about jurisdiction, which take the place of the national provisions.
This is true not only as regards foreigners suing in the Netherlands, but
also as regards Dutchmen, insofar as the stipulations of the Treaty
apply, for the juridical condition of the latter should not be worse than
that of foreigners. In case of a change of nationality after the cause
for divorce has arisen, the court of the last domicil of the spouses is
deemed by our courts to be competent.9 1
Art 3, Dutch Civil Code.
Ct. The Hague (June 26, I9O2) W. 9393.
This article was applied in the decision mentioned in the foregoing note.
"Art. 5, Dutch Civil Code.
Trib. Utrecht (Oct. 24, 1902) W. 944i; Ct. The Hague (June 9, 1913)
W. 9522; Trib. Breda (March 26, 1918), (1918) N. J. 788.
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The treaty deals also with the effect of divorce decrees within the
Convention territory. Provided that the provisions of the treaty re-
lating to divorce have been observed, the recognition of judgments is
compulsory.92 Another condition which must be fulfilled is, that when
the decree is rendered by default, the defendant must have been
served with process according to the rules required by his personal law
for the recognition of foreign judgments. Our courts have decided in
this connection the following interesting case.
A foreign court divorced two Dutch persons, although the marriage
had not been concluded according to Dutch law and therefore should
have been annulled. Was the divorce to be recognized in the Nether-
lands, with the effect that the marriage before the granting of the
divorce was to be accepted as valid? It was held that the Convention
applies only to marriages which are considered as valid in the Conven-
tion territory. When this condition is lacking on account of the nullity
of the marriage, a divorce pronounced later on need not be recognized
in Holland and the annulment of the marriage can still be pro-
nounced.9
3
Legitimacy and Legitimtion. One of the most important subjects
at the present time is certainly the question concerning the statutunt
personale and the personal law with respect to paternity and descent.
This is also the case with regard to the status of a legitimate child.
The personal law determines the conditions required for the claim of
legitimacy, the evidence to be furnished, the question whom plaintiff
ought to summon, and the time within which this must be done. There
are no Dutch decisions on this point, but the correctness of these princi-
ples is beyond any doubt in view of articles 6 and 9, Wet A. B.
A suit for the establishment of legitimacy, which the Dutch law
allows, may be brought also by a foreigner staying in Holland, who
may a~k a Dutch court to determine his status according to his personal
law. Dutch courts have jurisdiction as regards Dutchmen residing in
Holland who contend that they are the legitimate descendants of
Dutchmen living abroad. Dutch courts, of course, have no jurisdiction
concerning foreigners who have their domicil in a foreign country.
The reverse of the child's claim of legitimacy is the reputed father's
denial of the child's legal status. Foreigners living in Holland may
appeal to Dutch courts in this matter, both the conditions requisite for
the establishment of the petitioner's claim, and the means of evidence
by which they are to be proved, being governed by their personal law.
Moreover, the child residing in Holland will be protected in Holland in
accordance with the local provisions concerning the status of legitimate
and illegitimate children. A child can not lose its status, therefore,
on account of its national law, when the domiciliary law does not admit
*" Art. 7, Dutch Civil Code.
' Trib. The Hague (Dec. 5, 911) W. 9614.
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the father's claim. JittaP" objects even to the recognition in the Neth-
erlands of a decree rendered abroad by a court of the child's nationality
denying the child's legitimacy, if the illegitimacy could not have been
established in Holland. He is of opinion that the jurisdiction of the
domicil, which would maintain the legitimacy, is to be preferred to the
national jurisdiction, invoked by the father to deny it. It seems rea-
sonable, however, that when a foreign child has been pronounced
illegitimate by a foreign court, such a judgment should be recognized
in Holland as a valid decision, for there would appear no sufficient
reason for the Dutch courts to interfere with the question and to deny
the validity of such a decree.
Before discussing the subject of legitimation, some words must be
said about the recognition of natural and illegitimate children, a process
which, according to Dutch law, produces certain civil relations between
the child and the parent, without, however, putting recognized children
on the same footing as legitimate children.
The conditions and consequences of recognition are governed by the
personal law of the child and the parent, when they both have one com-
mon nationality. When both parents are of a different nationality, an
interesting conflict may arise on account of the provision of article 339
of the Dutch Civil Code, requiring the mother's consent to a recogni-
tion by the father. The object of this article is to protect the mother,
who ought to have an opportunity to judge whether the intended rela-
tion between the father and the child will or will not be in the interest
of the child and herself. When a Dutch father recognizes a child, born
of a foreign mother, it will not be necessary to submit the whole matter
of recognition to the Dutch law; but the necessity of the mother's con-
sent will depend upon the mother's personal law. The consequence of
this principle is, that when the mother is a Portuguese or a Belgian
woman, her consent is not required, because the laws of those countries
do not provide for itY5 In the same way, the child's personal law
should be decisive, if the child's own consent is necessary for its recog-
nition by the father.
When the child has another nationality than its parents, the personal
law of the recognizing parent governs the conditions necessary for the
recognition, but the child's own personal law controls the questions
whether and how the child may itself object to such recognition.
In this connection we may refer to the law of 1892, regulating Dutch
nationality. This law says that a child which has not been recognized
either by its mother or by its father, has the Dutch nationality when
Jitta, 393.
STrib. Amsterdam (June 26, 19ii) W. 9422; Ct. Amsterdam (May 2, 1913)
W. 9557; Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 24, 19x2); Ct. Amsterdam (June 27, 1913)
W. 9438.
LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS
born in the Netherlands. If it should be recognized later by a for-
eigner, it will obtain that foreigner's nationality, with retroactive
effect.
There is only one exception to be made to the application, of the for-
eign personal law. Children born of adulterous or incestuous relations
cannot be recognized by Dutch law, and this provision applies to for-
eigners recognizing a natural child in Holland. To hold that the
provisions of the Dutch law are inapplicable to foreigners in Holland
would oppose good morals. It is questionable, however, if public pol-
icy in our country denies validity to the recognition of such children
when it has taken place in another country, and it seems probable that
such recognition would be considered as good. JittaP
8 and Kosters97
are of opinion that there is not an absolute impediment to such a recog-
nition, because innocent children should not be deprived of their rights
obtained abroad.
A claim to the legal recognition of natural paternity cannot be
entertained by the Dutch courts, but a claim on account of maternity is
admitted. Dutchmen staying abroad should on this point observe their
national law, lest the judgments pronounced in this regard might not
be recognized, in the Netherlands. Foreigners in Holland are abso-
lutely subject to Dutch law on this point, for Dutch good morals are
opposed to a claim of status on account of paternity, made by foreign
natural children in reliance upon their personal law, which differs so
profoundly from Dutch law, and would be contrary to its spirit, which
seeks to secure tranquillity of family life. But if the foreign law, con-
trary to the Dutch law, allows such an action on account of paternity, a
decree of a foreign court establishing such relationship, as well as the
status created thereby, may be recognized in the Netherlands. 8
A child may obtain a legitimate status also by legitimation. This
institution is governed also as to its intrinsic validity and its conse-
quences by the personal law, as regards legitimation by subsequent mar-
riage. The parents' national law determines whether their marriage
entitles their children, born out of wedlock; to become legitimate.
When the national law of two foreigners marrying in the Netherlands
does not know such a legitimation, the children remain illegitimate,
although the children's personal law-if different-allows the contrary.
If the child's personal law does not know such a legitimation, although
the law of the parents admits it,,the legitimation can not be forced upon
the child. In such a case the child may rely upon its own law, and
object to the legitimation.99
The Dutch provision that legitimation is only possible after previous






such recognition belong to the essentials of legitimation, so that it is a
necessary condition whenever the personal law requires it? Or does
the previous recognition concern the form of legal acts, so that it has
to be performed always in the Netherlands, although a similar provision
does not exist in the personal law? The better answer would appear
to be that the recognition is an essential part of legitimation, and is sub-
ject, therefore, to the personal law, especially since a Dutch child will
acquire the status of legitimacy only after being recognized.
Foreigners, in order to be legitimated in the Netherlands, need not
be previously recognized, if this is not required by their personal law.
Dutchmen staying abroad, on the other hand, have to recognize their
child before legitimation, because the legitimation can only then be
considered as valid in Holland. When a foreigner has legitimated his
child abroad without previous recognition, such legitimation will be
regarded as valid in Holland. Those children will enjoy, therefore,
the same rights with respect to movables and immovables situated in
Holland as are possessed by legitimate children.
According to Dutch law a child can also become legitimated by so-
called letters of legitimation, issued by the Queen upon the advice of
the Supreme Court. Those marks of favor may as a rule be given
only to Dutchmen, but in some particular cases such legitimation is ex-
tended also to foreigners residing in Holland, if it conforms with the
provisions of their personal law. Dutchmen can receive such letters
only from the native authorities; no validity can be attached to letters
issued by foreign authorities.
When the parents and the child have different nationalities, the
personal law of the parents is decisive as to the question whether such
letters may be given. If the parents have different nationality, the
father's personal law is applicable. Legitimation by means of such
letters makes the child legitimate from the date of the parents' mar-
riage.
Adoption. It is difficult to say very much about adoption, because
this institution is unknown to Dutch law, and Dutch courts never have
been asked to pass upon the question. In principle the national law
should be decisive, but considerations of public policy may oppose. As
a matter of fact no adoption proceedings can take place in the Nether-
lands, nor can Dutchmen be validly adopted abroad, because such
adoption would be contrary to Dutch law. Where a foreigner has
been adopted abroad, it may be recognized as legal in Holland, so long
as he remains a foreigner." But when the foreigner has become a
naturalized Dutchman, we are inclined to think that the previous
adoption will become invalid; because no Dutchman can ever acquire
an adoptive relationship towards other people.
Parental power., The relation of parents and minor children is de-
termined by their personal law, because it belongs to the status of
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persons, so far as the exercise of the parental power and the rights
arising therefrom with regard to persons and property are concerned. 2
When the nationality of parents and children is the same' no difficulty
arises. Foreign parents staying in the Netherlands are then allowed
to exercise their parental power according to their common personal
law, provided that they do not act in contravention of Dutch notions
of public policy. Their right of punishing the children is restricted,
therefore, to the measure admitted in Holland.3 As regards parental
power Holland is thus more liberal than, for example, Great Britain,
where the personal relation of parents and children staying in England
is governed by English law.4
In the Netherlands the father or mother exercising the parental
power enjoys the right of usufruct in the property of their minor
children. Opinions differed formerly regarding the question whether
the personal law decides this point or the law of the country where the
property is situated, at least with respect to foreign immovables. Ac-
cording to the modern view the personal law is decisive, because the
essential point is not the provisions governing the ownership of immov-
ables, but the personal relation of the parent and the child.
In the Netherlands the parental power may be declared lost or for-
feited if it is in the child's interest and if there is a court which is
competent, ratione loci.5 In such a case the court of the parent's dom-
icil has jurisdiction. A judgment of this kind may be based upon a
cause which is not recognized by the personal law. Indeed, all of these
rules concern the protection of children in the Netherlands and are
applicable, therefore, to all parents residing within Dutch territory.
If the parent has abandoned his domicil in Holland, the courts of
the last domicil there have jurisdiction. Dutchmen may be deprived,
therefore, of their parental powers by their national' judge, even after
they have left their native country. Of course, this does not exclude
the possibility of a decree by a foreign court, declaring the parental
power to be lost after their settling in the foreign country, and the
decision of such a court would certainly be recognized in Holland, pro-
vided that the personal law has been observed.
No cases have arisen respecting the governing law where there is a
difference between the nationality of the parents and that of the chil-
dren. Kosters is of opinion that the personal law of the parents is
decisive, because the rights arising from the parental power tend to
protect the family life and because the child owes its status to its par-
ents. This view is preferable to the opinion that the parental power
especially tends to the child's protection. The personal law is applica-
ble also to the parents' right of usufruct in the property of their chil-
dren situated in Holland or abroad.
2 Trib. The Hague (June 29, I915) IV. P. N. R. 2380.
'Jitta, 410. 'Dicey, Conflict of Laws (1896) 492.
CL Amsterdam (June 21, 1915) W. 9869. 'Kosters, 56o-561.
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Guardianship of minors. Guardianship is governed by the national
law of the interested parties.7  If the nationality of the parents and of
the child or that of the guardian and of the child differ, the question
as to which will control depends in each case upon the nature of
guardianship. If the guardianship is to be considered as a consequence
of the relation of parents and children, it being a continuation of a
previous parental power, the personal law of the parents is decisive.
This law determines whether and in what manner the parental power
passes into guardianship;, whether it is necessary to appoint a co-
guardian, and the rights and duties of the guardian or co-guardian.
This doctrine is more in accordance with sound theory than that of an
old judgment, which selected the personal law of the child.8 If the
guardianship is exercised by a third person and not by a parent, and
has been called into existence on behalf of the child without the co-
operation of the parents, the personal law of the ward, in whose favor
the guardian is appointed, is decisive.
In Holland a foreigner may be appointed guardian of a Dutch minor.
Indeed, our law provides that when the guardian resides abroad, a
ward acquires the domicil of his co-guardian. The purpose of this
provision' is to prevent the withdrawal of Dutch wards from their
national jurisdiction. In order that such wards may retain a domicil
in Holland in regard to all matters concerning guardianship, the law
requires the co-guardian to be an inhabitant of the Dutch Kingdom.9
From these rules it is manifest that the legislature had no intention of
exempting foreigners from appointment as guardians.10 Kosters,
nevertheless, is of the opinion that foreigners are obliged to accept a
Dutch guardianship to the same extent as Dutchmen are, whenever
they are connected with the Netherlands by a permanent domicil.11
When a foreigner has accepted the guardianship of a Dutch ward
the Dutch law determines the obligations incumbent upon him. 12
In the absence of a legal or testamentary guardian, the county judge
appoints a guardian. The competent judge is the judge of the ward's
domicil. When the ward is domiciled abroad, the judge of his last
domicil in Holland may appoint a guardian, and if he never had domicil
in this country, such appointment may be made by the judge at Amster-
dam.1" These rules, however, do not affect the consular laws.
If a person is appointed abroad as a guardian of Dutch minors, such
appointment will be recognized in Holland, provided that the Dutch
7 Trib. The Hague (June 29, 1915) W. P. N. R. 238o.
'Trib. Maastricht (Dec. 2o, I86O) W. =54.
'Sup. Ct. (Jan. ig, 19I1) IV. 9131.
Trib. Maastricht (Dec. 28, 1843) W. 473, and (Dec. 20, 186o) W. 2254.
"Kosters, 570.
12Trib. Amsterdam (March 15, i87), (1872) Rechtsgeleerd Bijblad, 303 (this
periodical is no longer published).
" Art. 417, Dutch Civil Code.
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law concerning guardianship has been observed. This condition is
not fulfilled if the office of co-guardian is unknown in the foreign
country, so that only a guardian has been appointed for the Dutch
ward. A guardianship of this kind is not valid in the Netherlands,1"
it becoming necessary to establish a new guardianship in our country.
Dutch courts have jurisdiction to appoint guardians for foreign
minors residing in the Netherlands, even though the parents live abroad,
provided that the child's personal law is observed. The rights and
duties of guardianship for foreigners, as well as the administration of
such guardianship are governed by the ward's personal law. Our
courts hold, accordingly, that the personal law determines whether a
guardian needs the court's authorization for the sale or the pledge of
the ward's property (such authorization being required in the Nether-
lands), and if such authorization is required, from what court consent
may be obtained.15 The same law determines also the necessity of such
an authorization with respect to immovables situated in the Netherlands
and belonging to a foreign ward. From the foregoing it is seen, there-
fore, that the personal law prevails over that of the lex rei sitae.
Guardianship is in part controlled by the rules of the Treaty of The
Hague of June 12, 1902.10 This treaty also is based upon the rule of
the personal law, the protection of minors being considered as the
chief consideration. The public policy of the country where the minor
resides only requires the appointment of a guardian; it does not prohibit
the exercise of such guardianship according to foreign law. The ad-
ministration by the guardian is subject, therefore, to the personal law,
irrespective of the situs of the property; unless, perhaps, the law of
the country where the immovable is located should subject such prop-
erty to a special property r6gime, for example, the institutions of fiefs,
primogeniture, or homesteading. As these are unknown in Dutch law,
the above qualification has significance only if the immovable is situated
in some other country in which the particular institution exists.
Article 8 of the treaty imposes upon the authorities of the state
within whose territory there is a foreign minor for whom it is neces-
sary to create a guardianship, the duty of informing the authorities of
the state of which the minor is a subject, of this situation, and the au-
thorities so notified should at the earliest possible moment indicate to
the authorities giving such notice whether a guardianship has been or
will be created there. If this has not been and will not be done, a
guardian may be appointed at the actual residence of the child, accord-
ing to the local law.'7  This guardianship will be replaced, however,
1, See Trib.'s Hertogenborch (Dec. 2, 1864) W. 2648 (guardianship of a Dutch
child in the State of New York).
" Trib. Middelburg (March 31, 1847) W. 1009; Cty. Ct. Brielle (Oct. 25, i88o)
W. 4583; Cty. Ct. Ensched6 (Dec. 24, 1909) W. 9028.
"e Approved by the law of July 24, 1903, and ratified by the Crown.
"
TArt. 3, Dutch Civil Code.
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by a national guardianship as soon as the authorities of the native
country act in the matter. This agrees with one of our decisions, hold-
ing that a Dutch court has the authority to dismiss a guardian, ap-
pointed in Belgium for a Dutch minor residing in that country.1 8
SUCOESSION
In general. In the course of years two systems have contended for
mastery. One considers the inheritance as a universality of goods, and
therefore submits all movables and immovables to the single law of the
testator's origin. The other holds that immovables are governed by
the law of the country where they are situated. The last mentioned
system has maintained itself in Dutch jurisprudence. Our Supreme
Court still held in 1907 that the immovable part of an inheritance was
governed by the lex rei sitae. It based its decision upon article 7, Wet
A. B. which applies this law to immovables, holding that there is no
reason to exempt from the operation of this rule immovable property
belonging to a succession. 9
The Supreme Court has never decided by what law the movable part
of an inheritance is to be controlled. The court is likely to select the
law of the testator's last domicil on the ground that his movables are
deemed, in legal contemplation, to be at that place.0 No conclusion can
be reaclied, however, in view of the Court's silence, especially because
both the text-writers and the decisions of other courts maintain the
doctrine that the inheritance as a whole is to be governed by one law.
The possibility exists that the Supreme Court will revert to this theory
some day, the more so, because it applied this system on two former
occasions, preferring at that time the testator's latest domicil.21 Recent
judgments of the Supreme Court and of the court at Rotterdam
apply the lex rei sitae to immovables, and the personal law of the testa-
tor to the remaining part of the succession. 22
Jitta2 3 and Kosters24 also favor the doctrine of the universality of
prperty and the application of the personal law. The latter is pre-
ferred because Dutch law tends to apply such law as regards capacity.
Moreover, article 7, Wet A. B. regulates only the condition of immov-
ables considered separately, but says nothing about the acquisition of
immovable property by succession.
According to Dutch law, the individuality of the deceased is con-
tinued by his heirs. Their rights and duties are to be governed, there-
fore, by the law determining the testator's status. Moreover, it is
'Cty. Ct. Amsterdam (Oct 22, i9o6) W. 8458.
Sup. Ct (April 5, I9O7) W. 8524; Ct. Arnhem (April 27, igio) W. 9o52.
Kosters, 62!.
Sup. Ct. (Feb. 15, i86i) W. 2278, and (Nov. 17, 1887) W. 5502.
' Sup. Ct. (June 23, 1913) W. P. N. R. 2279; Trib. Rotterdam (May 4, 1914)
W. P. N. R. 2340.
' Jitta, 542. "Kosters, 62z.
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probable that, so far as testamentary succession is concerned, the
testator, in disposing of his property, had his personal law in view and
intended the application of that law.
The personal law of the testator governs his own capacity to make
a will and the capacity of the heirs to acquire property by way of intes-
tate or testamentary succession, the right of accepting or repudiating
the inheritance, the transmission of the assets and debts, the duty of
collation, the separation of the inheritance, and the capacity of the ex-
ecutors of a will 25 The nationality of the heirs is of no consequence.
This system, however, was considered many years ago as too bold by
some courts, in the case where the testator was a foreigner and the
heir a Dutchman. They applied Dutch law to the consequences of an
acceptance under benefit of inventory (without liability of incurring
debts beyond assets), made by a Dutch heir, though the testator was a
foreigner.28
Dutch law will preclude the application of the personal law, of course,
to the inheritance of a foreigner, deceased in Holland, if such applica-
tion is opposed to public policy. The personal law may deprive a per-
son of his right of inheriting for a cause not admitted by Dutch law,
for example, because of civil death or ecclesiastical ordination. Per-
sons excluded trom the inheritance on the above grounds are capable
of inheriting in Holland.
Exceptions of this kind based upon public policy are possible also in
relation to immovables. Institutions foreign to Dutch law cannot be
created with respect to Dutch immovables owned by a foreigner by
virtue of' his personal law. For example, no rights of primogeniture,
of homestead, or heirship rights (Anerbenrecht) can be created in this
way.
The foregoing general rules are applied also to particular mat-
ters of succession, for example, to the question how an inheritance is
to be acquired, or whether a separate acceptance is necessary. Accord-
ing to Dutch jurisprudence, the heirs get possession of the property at
the moment of the testator's death, all his property and claims being
acquired without any particular act of acceptance.27 A court passing
on the inheritance of a Dutchman, will apply these rules, but cannot
prevent, of course, the heirs living in other countries from obtaining
possession of property situated abroad, according to the rules of the
lex rei sitae. Such an acquisition may not be recognized, however,
in the Netherlands, for the heirs residing in Holland are entitled to the
inheritance, even though their rights are interfered with by foreign
claimants.28
" Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 28, 1914) W. 985o.
"Trib. Amsterdam (Oct. 18, 1859) W. 2139; Trib. Rotterdam (March 9,
i859), (i86o) Rechtsgeleerd Bijblad, 372.
"Arts. 88, 1002, Dutch Civil Code. IArt. 881.
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The acquisition of an inheritance belonging to a foreigner occurs
according to his personal law. Questions about repudiation are gov-
erned by the same law. Some difficulty may arise from article 1103 of
the Dutch Civil Code. According to this provision, a repudiation must
be made by a declaration before the court within whose jurisdiction
the property was located at the time of the testator's death. But this
law does not say who is competent to receive such a declaration if the
Dutchman dies in a foreign country. It is reasonable to assume that
article 1103 only concerns inheritances becoming vacant in the Nether-
lands, so that the above mentioned declaration is not required under
these circumstances. Jitta29 suggests that the court of the testator's
last domicil in Holland has jurisdiction. The question has not been
decided, however, by our courts.
Foreigners in Holland, intending to repudiate a Dutch inheritance,
as well as Dutch heirs, should observe the provisions of article 1103.
Testamentary. In the Netherlands the capacity of foreigners to dis-
pose of their property by a will is judged according to the testator's
personal law. This law will apply also to the capacity of the heirs to
take under a will, because the Dutch law in regulating this matter- had
in view the protection of the testator's property. It must yield, how-
ever, to the Dutch provisions which exclude some particular categories
of persons from'succession. An heir who is incapable according to
Dutch law, is, therefore, excluded, although his personal law allows
him to acquire property under the will.
The right to dispose of one's property is rather severely restricted
in Holland by the rules concerning the legal reserve on behalf of the
nearest relations. These rules do not establish, however, a public
policy, so that a more liberal right of disposition according to the per-
sonal law of the testator will be recognized in Holland. Where a
Dutchman had become naturalized in another country and had made
use thereafter of the privilege conferred by his new personal law, the
Supreme Court applied this new law, because the extent of the legal
reserve was to be judged according to the testator's law at the time of
his death. 30
As regards the form of wills, we have an article in the Dutch Civil
Code which has given rise to much controversy. Article 992 author-
izes Dutch subjects to make a will in another country only in an
"authentic" form and with due observance of the usual formalities
prescribed for such acts by the Dutch law. A foreign court, passing
on the validity of a Dutchman's will, may have to solve the questions
therefore, whether the provision of the above-mentioned article con-
cerns ohly the "form" of legal acts, so as to call for the application of
the rule locus regit actun, or whether it constitutes a restriction with
Jitta, 567.
" Sup. Ct. (June 27, 1913) W. P. N. R. 2279.
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respect to "capacity." In the latter event the personal law ought to be
observed even abroad, under penalty of annulment of the will. If the
will by a Dutch subject abroad is not "authentic," it will have to be
pronounced invalid by the Dutch courts. Although article 992 deals
with the form of acts, it states plainly that the provision is to apply to
Dutchmen abroad. Whether a Dutchman complies with the article
992, by making an holographic will abroad and entrusting it to a notary
public for safe-keeping, a mode of execution which would give the will
validity if made in Holland, is doubtful. A decision rendered in 1886
held such a will to be invalid. A will made under private signature
and written by the testator himself was not deemed to acquire the pre-
scribed authenticity by being deposited with a notary public, though its
validity would be undoubted if so executed in the Netherlands.31
Later the same court changed its view and admitted that kind of a will
to probate as a valid authentic document.3 2
It seems preferable to say that the act is authentic if the forms which
the lex loci requires for such an act have been observed, so that the
validity of the will would depend on the observance of that law. When
this law c6nsiders the custody of an holographic will as conferring
upon it an authentic character, the instrument should be recognized also
in the Netherlands. 3 The validity of a will made by a foreigner in
Holland will be recognized, on the other hand, if its form satisfies the
requirements of the law of the place of execution. 3 '
The interpretation of legal clauses, deeds, and wills is so closely con-
nected with the judge's personal views, based upon the law, that no
other law than the lex fori can be applied. Indeed all foreign pro-
visions concerning interpretation, if useful to our courts, are inter-
preted by a Dutch judge in conformity with his own laws. Moreover,
Dutch law states in regard to the subject of contracts and wills, that
explicit terms are decisive; so that no application by means of inter-
pretation is allowed when the words are plain. These provisions are
applicable to all wills of foreigners, although the succession itself is
governed by a foreign law.
Other provisions relating to interpretation, however, have another
character, for example, articles 924 and 925 of the Dutch Civil Code,
containing particular rules about the meaning of "the nearest relations,"
"the poor" and so on, when used in wills. These provisions form an
integral whble with the general provisions of the law, and will follow
Dutchmen, therefore, abroad. When the personal law of a foreign
testator is applied by a Dutch court, it enforces all provisions similar to
those mentioned above. This is the meaning of the decision that the
' Trib. Amsterdam (July 6, I886), (886) Paleis van Justitie, Nos. 49-50
(this periodical is no longer published).
,Trib. Amsterdam (June 28, 1904) W. P. N. R. i8o7.
"Kosters, 645; J. Offerhaus, Nederlandsch internationaal bewijsrecht 48-50.
" Jitta, i5o.
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word rinunziare, occurring in an Italian instrument, must be inter-
preted according to Italian law, in view of the fact that the Italian
Civil Code attaches a very particular notion to the repudiation of an
inheritance.8 5
Jurisdiction for the determination of claims against the state belongs
to the courts of the place where the testator had his domicil at the time
of his death.8" This rule is applicable to the succession of all testators
who died domiciled in Holland, irrespective of their foreign nationality.
Article 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer jurisdiction
upon any courts as regards foreign successions abroad, even though
the testator is a Dutchman. The consequence of this silence is that
there is, generally spealing, no competent judge in the last mentioned
casep.87
It is possible, however, that a Dutch court has' jurisdiction in respect
to property belonging to a foreign inheritance, for example, that of a
Dutchman who died in a foreign country, if a suit is brought by a cred-
itor of the estate against an heir residing in the Netherlands. In this
event the Dutch court's jurisdictioii is based upon the defendant's dom-
icil.38
The distribution of the property is made according to the personal
law of the testator, so far as no intervention of the authorities is re-
quired. Such an intervention is sometimes necessary, however, accord-
ing to Dutch law. When the heirs cannot dispose of their goods freely
(for example, if they are minors), articles III 7 and 1120 of the Dutch
Civil Code require for the distribution of the property the approval of
the county judge.
Is this rule applicable also when a foreigner is an heir? Some people
answer this question in the negative, because the said provision concerns
the personal statute and is not applicable, therefore, to foreigners.39
Others are of opinion that the law was meant to protect those who can-
not co-operate in the distribution and that such protection should be
extended, therefore, to Dutchmen and foreigners alike.40 The Su-
preme Court has held that when there are minor heirs living in Hol-
land, of Dutch or foreign nationality, the jurisdiction of the Dutch
county judge extends to the distribution of the property left by a
Dutchman who died abroad. A foreign court has jurisdiction in this
Ct. Amsterdam (Dec. 2, r918), (1919) N. J. 4o3, W. 10433, W. P. N. R.
2584.
'Art. 126, sec. 12, Code of Civil Procedure.
'Trib. The Hague (Nov. 9, 1877) W. 418o; Sup. Ct. (Apr. 21, 191I) W.
9174; Trib. Haarlem (Jan. 2, 1917) W. P. N. ?. 247o; Ct Amsterdam (Dec. 2,
I918) (1gig) N. J. 4o3, W. 10433, W. . N. R. 2584.
' Decision of Ct. Amsterdam, mentioned in the foregoing note.
Cty. Ct. Goor (Oct. 22, 1892) W. 6267; Cty. Ct. Medemblik (Jan. 20, 1893)
W. 6513.
" Trib. Almelo (Nov. 8, 1892) W. 6267; Kosters, 652.
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case, generally speaking, but the executors may ask the assistance of the
Dutch county judge of their domicil, on behalf of the minor heirs living
in Holland.4 1
The second example is the following. According to Dutch law, the
heirs may demand an order of the court, directing the sale of the im-
movables belonging to an undivided inheritance, if the prqperty is
situated in Holland. This is done to promote the liquidation of the
estate and to facilitate the payment of debts. Our courts tend to hold
that Dutch law determines the question whether such an order should
be given, or whether the heirs should be allowed to effect a sale of their
own accord, without regard to the personal law of the deceased in this
respect.42  Kosters, 43 on the other hand, would adhere to the principle
that the personal law controls. According to our decisions, the court
competent to authorize such a sale is that of the place where the testa-
tor had his domicil when he died. Dutch courts are incompetent,
therefore, when the succession took place in a foreign country."4 In
only one case was it held that the local court had jurisdiction.
45 Ii
seems probable, however, that any Dutch court would assume jurisdic-
tion if an application for the sale of the property should be made by all
heirs.
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Courts. The written law fails to indicate when Dutch
courts have jurisdiction in matters of private international law. The
codes, especially the Code of Civil Procedure, only regulate the com-
petence of Dutch courts, ratione loci. As regards foreigners, Dutch
courts assume jurisdiction, however, if they live in Holland and there
is a judge who is competent, ratione loci.48 One of the most prominent
principles of Dutch procedure is that the court of the defendant's dom-
icil, and, in default of a domicil, the court of his actual residence, is
competent to hear and determine any personal action against him.
This principle is also applicable to a defendant who is a foreigner. In
this way every plaintiff-either a Dutchman or a foreigner-may sum-
mon before a Dutch court a defendant who is a foreigner, provided
the latter has his domicil or actual residence in the Netherlands.
47
Sup. Ct. (Feb. I3, 1893) W. 63ol.4 Trib. Goes (May 1g, 1841) W. 2o6; Trib. The Hague (Dec. 3, igog) W.
912&
' Kosters, 654.
"Trib. Breda (Nov. 18, i8go) W. 5951; Trib. Haarlem (Sept. I0, 1892)
W. P. N. R. I187; Ct. Amsterdam (Sept. 3o, 1892) W. P. N. R. II9O.
Trib. The Hague (Dec. 3, I909) W. 9128.
Trib. The Hague (March ig, 1918) W. 1o339; Ct. Amsterdam (Dec. 2, I918),
(igig) N. J. 403, W. 10433, W. P. N. R. 2584.
"Trib. Rotterdam (Feb. 15, 1915), (9r5) N. J. 1O63; Trib. Breda (May 22,
1917), (9,7) N. J. 594; Trib. The Hague (June 27, 1918) W. 1o367.
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The preliminary questions whether there is a competent judge and
whether the defendant can be considered as having a domicil or a resi-
dence in Holland, are determined exclusively by the lex fori.4 8 There
is no jurisdiction, therefore, if the lex fori does not admit the judge's
competence, ratione loci.
Jitta49 maintains that the jurisdiction of Dutch courts is based either
upon their authority with regard to the defendant or upon their au-
thority with respect to the subject-matter. Authority in regard to the
defendant means, that the courts in each country are under a duty to
protect all persons living within its territory against unjust demands
and to compel them to comply with their just obligations. In these
cases the Dutch court's jurisdiction is clearly well-founded. But what
are the rules of jurisdiction, when the defendant has his residence
abroad? Article 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
foreigners, even when domiciled in another country, may be sued
before Dutch courts in respect of contracts concluded with Dutchmen.
Before the year 1838 article 14 of the French Civil Code prevailed in
the Netherlands, which allowed French citizens to sue foreigners living
outside of French territory, before French courts. When the French
code was repealed in the Netherlands, the legislature desired that
Dutchmen should not be placed in a disadvantageous position as com-
pared with Frenchmen. Article 127 was intended, therefore, to con-
fer upon them the privilege of suing foreigners before their own
courts, when these courts would be without jurisdiction according to
the ordinary rtles. One of the consequences of this rule-which refers
only to contracts concluded with Dutchmen-is, that the privilege does
not exist if the contract was originally concluded between two foreign-
ers, the claim being subsequently assigned to a Dutchman."
The Supreme Court interprets article 127 as being closely connected
with article 9, Wet A. B, which puts foreigners upon a footing of
equality with Dutchmen as regards civil law. The "civil law" is held
to include the right to sue in a court which has jurisdiction as to law-
suits between Dutchmen.5 1 From this it follows that a foreigner may
sue another foreigner residing abroad before a Dutch court. Dutch
courts have jurisdiction, therefore, in suits between two foreigners,
provided that there is a judge who is competent, ratione loci.
A limitation upon the authority of our courts with respect to this
subject-matter is to be found in article 314 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. This article provides that in commercial matters the courts of
the place where the contract was concluded, where the goods were
delivered, and where the payment is due, are competent. Our courts
"Trib. Breda (Nov. 28, I916), (1917) N. J. I4o; Trib. The Hague (March 19,
i9x8) W. 10339.
"Jitta, 164.
"Sup. Ct. (May 29, 1914), (1914) N. J. 78o.
Sup. Ct. (June 2r, igoi) W. 7611.
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have concluded therefrom that these different courts are competent also
in matters of private international law, even when the parties are
foreigners and do not reside in the Netherlands.
52
Dutch courts are not competent, however, with respect to every dis-
pute which may arise in the Netherlands. In the matter of an attach-
ment in Holland against a debtor who has his domicil abroad, it has
been held by the Supreme Court that the law gives to the tribunal of
the debtor's domicil exclusive jurisdiction. There is no competent
judge, therefore, when the debtor resides abroad, though the attach-
ment has been made in the Netherlands.
53
A well-known provision of our law reads that the court of the plain-
tiff's domicil is competent when the defendant has not an actual resi-
dence in Holland. A plaintiff, though a foreigner, having a domicil in
Holland, may sue the defendant at his (the plaintiff's) Dutch domicil,
regardless of the place where the defendant may live. But a foreigner
who resides abroad has not such power, unless there is authority and
jurisdiction over the subject-matter as outlined above.
When the question relates to a breach of contract which has no
connection with this country, it can be based upon the domicil of one
of the parties, in accordance with the general rules already noticed.
During the war a Dutch vessel was sunk by German soldiers at
Mechlin (Belgium). The owner sued the German Empire before the
court at Rotterdam, which rendered a judgment against the former
Empire by default.54 The criticism of this judgment showed that most
of the lawyers were of opinion that the law of nations did not author-
ize a suit against a foreign power in a civil case. The judgment of the
tribunal of Rotterdam was annulled by the Court of Appeal.
5 5 The
legislature put an end to the controversy by adding a new article to the
Wet A. B. which provides: "The jurisdiction of courts and the execu-
tion of judgments and authentic documents is limited by the excep-
tions recognized in the law of nations." 5
The way in which an action is to be brought, especially by corpora-
tions. Every group of persons who are acting together in social life
as a corporation according to the laws of the country where their activ-
ity has its, central point, is recognized as such in the Netherlands and
may be sued as such.57 A difference of opinion exists as to whether
'Sup. Ct. (June 21, igoi) W. 7611; Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 6, 1912) W. 9510,
(i913) N. J. i99.
Sup. Ct. (Dec. 24, 1915) W. 9933.
"Trib. Rotterdam (Sept. 25, i916) W. ioo22, (1917) N. J. I3.
"Ct. The Hague (March 23, 1917) W. 1070, (1918) N. J. 38; see also Trib.
Rotterdam (April 2, 1917), (1917) N. J. 434, and Trib. Maastricht (Nov. 23,
1916), (917) N. J. i2.





such a corporation has to appear in the mode prescribed by its own
laws or according to the lex fori. Jitta and some of ,our courts con-
sider it reasonable that a corporation should act in the manner that is
customary in its own country.58  Other courts hold, on the other hand,
that the way in which foreign companies have to proceed in a Dutch
lawsuit is governed by the lex fori5
Summoning foreigners. Dutchmen and foreigners living in the
Netherlands must be served either personally or at their domicil.
When the defendant is a person living abroad, the summons is handed
to the public prosecutor of the court having jurisdiction in the case,
and this officer has to forward a copy to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs . 2 The time between the service of the summons and the
appearance before court is eight days. This time is extended to a
month when the defendant lives in one of the countries adjoining the
Netherlands, and may reach a limit of eight months, according to the
distance at which the defendant lives from Holland. For defendants
in the United States at least five months must be allowed.
Limitation of actions. The-most important question is whether the
law governing the subject-matter itself determines the period within
which an action'must be brought, or whether it is the law of the place
where the suit has been instituted.0 When an action which is pending
in the Netherlands is barred according to the law of the country whose
law governs the subject-matter itself, while it is not yei barred by the
statutes of the lex fori, the Dutch court will enforce the action." But
when the Dutch statute of limitations is shorter, it will prevail over
the foreign statute, because, as Jitta65 says, social peace considered
from an international point of view is thereby promoted.
Evidence. Dutch law is wavering between the Anglo-American sys-
tem, which classes the law of evidence among the provisions that are
subject to the lex fori, and the Italian law, which holds that the matters
of evidence in conflict of laws are determined by the law of the place
where the act is performed.6
It is quite certain that the lex fori controls the forms. The means
of evidence, however, tend to sustain existing relations, and should be
taken, therefore, from the conditions surrounding the facts to be
proved. Witnesses and documents especially derive their value from
Ct. The Hague (Nov. 3, 19o8) W. 8779; Sup. Ct. (April 30, 1909) W. 8868;
Trib. Rotterdam (Dec. 16, I916) W. P. N. R. 2478, (1917) N.J. 435
"' Ct. 's Hertogenborch (Aug. 5, 1899) W. 5926; Trib. Rotterdam (May i9,
1go)" W. 9o09; Trib. The Hague (March I6, 1911) W. 9i6o; Trib. Amsterdam
(May 29, 1914) W. 9683.
'Asser, Schetz van het internationaal privaatrecht, IO7.
'To the latter effect, see Ct. The Hague (March 15, 191o) W. 8984.
Ct. The Hague (March 23, I903) W. 7945.
Jitta, 340.
"Art. IO, Preliminary Dispositions, Italian Civil Code.
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the fact that they refer to circumstances occurring- while the parties
were still on friendly terms. These means of evidence are prepared
by the parties with a view of availing themselves thereof if a lawsuit
should occur. Some decisions relating to authentic instruments are in
accordance with these rules, while the ancient rule, locus regit actum,
has also a great influence upon this matter. An instrument is only au-
thentic if it was drawn up by or in the presence of a public officer who
is entitled to -act as such. The authority of these persons8 7 as well as
their quality,68 is always judged according to the law of the place where
the matter in question has its origin and where the instrument was
drawn up, not by the lex fori.
The same idea is to be found in the following case, which held that
the date of a contract of pledge, concluded in Germany, could not be
challenged by third persons residing in the Netherlands, although
article 1917 of the Dutch Civil Code, which requires the date to be
proved by an undeniable fact (such as the registration of the deed or
a party's death), had not been complied with. Article 1917 was
deemed inapplicable, because the parties had relied upon the validity of
the contract of pledge from the day it was drawn up, according to
German law.69
These arguments apply also to oral contracts. According to Dutch
law, no parol evidence by witnesses is allowed in respect to contracts,
the value of which exceeds 300 guilders. 0 Is this rule also applicable
to contracts concluded abroad, when the law under the government of
which the contract was called into existence, does not thus restrict the
proof of contracts? Our courts answer the question in the negative,
because the parties in making their contract must have relied upon the
fact that the contract may be proved by oral testimony and refrained on
that account to reduce it into writing. They were not obliged to reckon
with the provisions of a law which did not govern their judicial rela-
tions. 71
Another article provides that no weight can be attached to oral testi-
mony unless it is supported by at least two witnesses.72  Jitta73 con-
siders this article so stringent that Dutch courts would not be allowed
even in international matters to take into consideration the testimony of
one witness. It seems more reasonable to approve the view adopted
by the tribunal at Amsterdam to the effect that the law governing the
contract controls also in this regard.7'
'Trib. Almelo (Dec. 2, 1896) W. 6925; Trib. Rotterdam (June 24, 1914),
(1915) N. J. 362.
Sup. Ct. (Jan. 28, 1881) W. 4600 and Sup. Ct. (June 27, i88i) W. 4673.
' Ct. Amsterdam and Sup. Ct. (March 24, 29o5) W. 898..7 Art. 1933, Dutch Civil Code.
' Trib. Rotterdam (Oct. 13, 2914), (914) N. J. 312; Trib. The Hague (March
ig, i918) W. 10339.
'2Art. i94 Dutch Civil Code. "Jitta, 615.
14 Trib. Amsterdam (March 3, 19Ii) W. 9208.
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Some provisions of Dutch law are very closely connected with the
essential principles of Dutch procedure, so that a deviation from those
principles is not allowed. We may mention by way of illustration the
rules concerning the incompetency of witnesses (for example, descend-
ants in the direct line, etc.). As to these matters the requirements of
due procedure are deemed paramount in comparison with the private
interests of the parties. In respect to the challenging of witnesses
opinions differ." The courts have not passed on the question.
EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
In the exceptional cases in which foreign judgments are enforced,
an immediate execution is given after permission to that effect
has been obtained from the president of the tribunal within whose.
jurisdiction the execution is to take place. The most famous example
is article 724 of the Commercial Code, which enables despatches, stated
and approved abroad, immediately to be executed in the Netherlands.
Other examples are to be found in the treaty on the Rhine, the Railway
Convention of Berne and the Treaty of the Hague concerning divorce.7 6
Article 19 of the Treaty of the Hague on civil procedure provides for
the enforcement within all participating countries of judgments for
costs without a re-examination of the foreign proceedings. The treaty
requires that the judgment, the enforcement of which is sought, be
authentic, that no appeal from it be possible, and that certain other con-
ditions be fulfilled.
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Article 431 of the Code of Civil Procedure controls if the foreign
court, in deciding a question, derived its competence from its own law.
It may occur, however, that the court derived its competence, not from
the law, but from a particular clause of the parties' contract, in which
it was agreed that any controversies arising from the contract should
be determined by a particular judge. The amount so found to be due
can be enforced by the Dutch courts. Some courts consider such an
action, however, ag that enforcement of a foreign judgment which is
forbidden by Dutch law, and require that the matter be tried over
again. 8 Others are of the opinion that such a foreign judgment
settles only the amount due by virtue of the contract, unliquidated be-
fore, and that the plaintiff seeks, therefore, to enforce only what the
other party owes under the contract.7 9
The latter system has become the settled law in respect to foreign
judgments on arbitration. The arbitrators indicated in the contract, in
Jitta, 615; Kosters, 225; Offerhaus, op. cit. note 33, at p. 112.
Art. 7. , See Jitta, i7o; Kosters, 214.
Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. 25, 1914) W. 826o; Trib. Rotterdam (April 21, I915),
(1gs) N. J. 839.
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giving their decision, are generally deemed to fix the content of the
obligation, so that their judgment becomes, as it were, a part of the
contract. The successful party is allowed to enforce, therefore, in the
Dutch courts the amount found to be due.
8 0
Our courts also appear to apply article 431, which speaks only of
the enforcement of foreign judgments, when the foreign judgment is
invoked as res judicata, especially in regard to judgments based upon
contracts.81 The foreign judgment gives no guarantee, therefore,
that a new suit may not be brought before a Dutch court. Kosters
adheres to this conclusion, and denies that foreign judgments requiring
the performance of contractual obligations are res judicata in Holland.
In cases, however, in which the foreign court alone had jurisdiction,
and even in those cases in which the foreign judgment is not regarded
as being in conflict with Dutch notions of public policy, he would allow
the defence of res judicata.8 2
Article 431 is not applied, however, to foreign judgments not requir-
ing execution. For example, a foreign decree of bankruptcy or a
decree appointing a guardian may be recognized in the Netherlands.
3
As in all other cases, such decrees will not be recognized if a stringent
policy or the good morals of Holland would be violated thereby. So
when the status of a Dutchman is changed by a foreign court, such a
judgment can only be recognized in Holland if the Dutch law con-
cerning status has been observed.8 4
An interesting evolution may be observed in recent years with
respect to foreign judgments, which is characterized by an increasing
trust in the justice of judgments rendered abroad. It would be de-
sirable if this progress would go so far as to lead to the enforcement
of foreign judgments and their recognition as res judicatae.
"Ct. Amsterdam (March 13, I9I) W. 9227; Trib. Rotterdam (Feb. 17, I915)
(915) N. 3. 844; Trib. Haarlem (Feb. 18, igig), (igig) N. J. 283.
Ct. Amsterdam (June 26, 1885) W. 5257; Ct. The Hague (April 17, 1895)
W. 6725; Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 24, I9O8) W. 8935; Trib. Rotterdam (April 22,
1915), (1915) N. J. 841; Trib. Rotterdam (Nov. i8, 1915) W. 9968, (1916) N. J.
285; Sup. Ct (Dec. 8, I916) W. IOO54, (I917) N. J. 29; Trib. Amsterdam (Nov.
9, 1917), (i918) N. J. io8; Ct. Amsterdam (March i, i9i8), (1918) N. J. IO85;
Sup. Ct. (Dec. 6, 1918), (i919) N.J. 129.
' Sup. Ct. (Feb. 1, 1895) W. 6626; Trib. Middelburg (March 28, 19oo) W.
7527; Trib. Almelo (June 26, x9o7) W. 86o7; Trib. Amsterdam (April 4, i9IO),
(1913) N. J. 485.
Kosters, 219 ff.
Sup. Ct. (June 2, 1876) W. 3997; Trib. Rotterdam (April 14, 1913), (1913)
N. J. 697; Ct. Amsterdam (April 24, 1914), (9,5) N. J. 789; Trib. Amsterdam
(Jan 8, 1915), (915) N. J. 2o5; Sup. Ct. (Nov. 5, I915) W. 9938, (I916) N. J.
12; Sup. Ct (Nov. 24, 1916) W. IOO98, (1917) N. J. 5; Sup. Ct. (Feb. 23, 1917),
( t9s7) N. J. 347.
"' See the decisions mentioned in the foregoing note.
